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Research on socially aware systems requires fine-grained knowledge of the mechanisms
of persuasion in order to promote civic knowledge and aware political participation.
Within humor studies, political parody is generally considered a simple pleasant weapon
for political evaluation, currently explained by referring to the so called “just a joke effect”
(Nabi et al., 2007). Indeed the funny side of parody can induce positive emotions, but it
also includes a discrediting act that sometimes produces a “bitter laughter.” The present
study aims to understand the role played by negative and moral emotions aroused
by parody. A parody is defined as a communicative behavior (a discourse, text, body
movement, song) that imitates a communicative behavior or trait displayed by some
Target by reproducing it in a distorted way, with the aim of making fun of the Target.
Based on a socio-cognitive approach, a distinction is made between “surface” and
“deep” parody (Poggi and D’Errico, 2013), with the former simply imitating behaviors
actually displayed by the Target, and the latter implying a (humorous) re-categorization
of the Target. The paper studies the effect of these two different types of parody on
persuasion processes. Results show that the deep parody, as opposed to surface
parody, triggers more negative emotions, and in particular indignation, that in turn lead
to more negative evaluations of the Target. Moreover, the moral priming of parody is
influenced by the Target politician’s gender.
Keywords: parody, deep and surface parody, moral emotions, evaluation, political persuasion
INTRODUCTION. EVALUATION AND EMOTION
Persuasion is the art of inducing people to do things by convincing them that what you propose is
the right thing to do (Poggi, 2005). This process, aimed at causing a change of mind and possibly
a decision making in the other, implies leading the other to conceive of new particular evaluations:
“right” means that one assesses a job to choose, a product to buy, a policy to take, a candidate to
vote, by making reference to some criterion of evaluation, some goal with respect to which that is
the most adequate decision to make, or at least one better than another.
Affect is another process often implied in persuasion, since our final choice to do something
heavily depends on the emotions we feel about the entailed object, action, situation.
These two aspects are pointed out in Aristotle’s model of persuasion, according to which the
Audience is persuaded not only through logos (the orator’s discourse), but also through pathos (the
audience’s emotions), and ethos (the orator’s personality).
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The effectiveness of pathos – the appeal to emotions – is well-
known ever since classical rhetoric, that solicits the orator to
“movere et delectare,” to “move and amuse” the audience. The
importance of ethos, the orator’s personality, accounts for why,
for instance, politicians on the one side try to project the best of
their image during speeches and debates, while on the other try
to cast discredit over opponents: because spoiling the others’ face
undermines their persuasive potential.
A particular case in which criticism is conveyed and discredit
is cast over politicians is political satire, and within it, parody.
One can make a parody of a song, a film, a poem, or, finally, of a
person. The parody of a person (Target) is a distorted imitation
of some trait or behavior of the Target aimed at amusing the
audience and at making fun of that trait or behavior, or of the
person per se. And making fun of something or someone is a way
to cast discredit over it.
Therefore, political parody often has a deliberate persuasive
effect: to make the Target be evaluated negatively by the
Audience, the political critic (the satirical writer or comedian)
makes a parody of the Target to let him/her appear less smart,
altruistic, or strong than s/he tries to look, so as to weaken his/her
political appeal.
This paper explores the affective and evaluative processes
underlying the reception and comprehension of a political
parody, and the effects of different types of parody in terms of the
emotions triggered and of the evaluations elicited in the audience.
RELATED WORK
Within previous work on Parody, Holman and Harmon (1986)
define it as an imitation intended to ridicule or criticize,
that to be understood requires familiarity with the original
object, and to be effective must sound faithful to the original.
Rose (1979, 2011) sees parody of literary works as the comic
reworking of preformed material through their partial imitation
or evocation in a comic manner that marks the ambivalence of
the parodist’s attitude to the object of criticism. A parody contains
two texts-worlds, and the reader must understand the comic-
satiric relationship between them (Condren et al., 2008; Rose,
2011; Davis, 2013). Far from being a simple imitation, it is an
“approximation” to an original source where, like in sarcasm, “the
subject is treated in a contradictory manner: elevated subjects are
debased and low ones are elevated” (Kreuz and Roberts, 1993;
Condren et al., 2008; Davis, 2013). Bakhtin (1981, p. 76) views
the parodistic act as “an arena of conflict between two voices”
in a hostile contrast, where the second represents a “semantic
authority” with which the audience is expected to agree.
To Hulstijn and Nijholt (1996), verbal parody is a situated,
intentional, conventional speech act that re-presents some object
but flaunts the re-presentation to convey humorous criticism;
after Poggi and D’Errico (2013), like ridiculization, it is a form
of “moralistic aggression” (Bischof, 1980).
Rossen-Knill and Henry (1997) mention four pragmatic
aspects of parody: (1) the intentional verbal representation of the
object of parody, (2) the flaunting of the verbal representation,
(3) the critical act, and (4) the comic act.
The techniques exploited by the parodist to refashion an older
text or image range from caricature to substitution, addition,
subtraction (Rotermund, 1963), exaggeration, condensation,
contrast, and discrepancy (Davis, 2013).
In the parodistic act (Rotermund, 1963; Rose, 1979, 2011;
Luttazzi, 2001; Davis, 2013), the interaction between parodist
and audience is successful only if the audience acknowledges
the parodist’s authority and moralistic intention; but this also
requires knowledge of the target’s vices and virtues, especially
when the focus are his/her body and verbal features (tics,
stuttering. . .) that are the trigger of the comic part.
Political parody is a case of political satire, that is, a
communicative act aimed at eliciting laughter in order to
discredit a politician or a political party or ideology by making
fun of it, often aiming in turn at political persuasion (D’Errico
and Poggi, 2013). According to persuasion research, humor,
when used to discredit a person, is likely to persuade via the
“peripheral route” (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), and through
inhibiting counter-arguing (Nabi et al., 2007; Baumgartner et al.,
2012). The crucial feature of the peripheral route to persuasion is
that the stimulus is processed in a basic form, by eliciting only
simple inferences, as opposed to the central route, that on the
contrary involves higher motivation, more fine-grained message
processing and evaluation of the source’s arguments, thus finally
producing a more enduring attitude change.
Within this framework, Nabi et al. (2007), in the mass media
domain, study parody and the function of humor in it in terms of
its effects on attention, comprehension, credibility and judgment:
by investigating the “just a joke effect,” they show that humor,
while attracting attention, can promote the peripheral process
of persuasion since it causes distraction from critical parts of
the message. They find that humor promotes funnier messages,
a more enjoyable source, and less counter-arguing: a processing
chain they call “sleeper effect.”
In contrast, Baumgartner et al. (2012) reveal the “priming
effect” of satire, taking the so called “Fey effect” as an example:
during the Bush vs. McCain presidential campaign of 2008, the
satire of Sarah Palin made by the satirist Tina Fey reduced the
political evaluation of Palin in both republicans and democrats,
but mostly among older electors. The variability in the effect
of humor is due to the wide range of humoristic genres and
cultural differences, which can be understood if we consider
the description of psychological processes and message features
involved in parody persuasion. As to psychological processes,
the most investigated one is the “perceived funniness” on the
part of the audience, that implies a process of absorption and
distraction from the critical part of the parody; this causes a
decrease in counter-arguing, hence higher agreement on the
critical part of it (for a review see also Poggi et al., 2011).
From this point of view parody can be seen as a “discounting”
mechanism that causes a negative evaluation of the parodied
politicians, but perceived funniness counterbalances this negative
effect (Matthes and Rauchfleisch, 2013). The audience, when
exposed to parody, is focused on the comic message because
it provides humorous pleasure, but reduces scrutiny of the
criticism borne by the message (Young, 2008; LaMarre et al.,
2014).
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In particular such discount effect is noticeable when viewers
are young and have low “political” knowledge (Boukes et al.,
2015), because they do no have enough competence to grasp
indirect meanings within the parodistic message. The authors
specify that actually political parody differs from “daily parody”
in terms of explicit reference to daily situations and events:
this is why the latter can imply less cognitive effort. As to the
message features, Holbert et al. (2011) distinguishes two types
of satire, a horatian and a juvenalian one, and points out how
they can differently affect emotions and hence counter-argument:
the horatian satire can be considered a comedy, a lighter form
of satire than the juvenalian one, that can be more acid in
tone (D’Errico and Poggi, 2014), more “savage and merciless”
(Sander, 1971); the horatian parody is evaluated more funny by
persons with low political ability, whereas high ability persons
prefer juvenalian parody, and this also affects their possibility
to counter-argue. Boukes et al. (2015) too compares “gentle” to
“harsh” forms of parody, highlighting how lighter forms of humor
are less persuasive and “critical,” because they are based on lighter
cognitive effort and more humoristic pleasure. Finally, another
variable that can activate the disengaged cognitive route is the
political congruity between candidate and audience: Boukes et al.
(2015) in fact noted that an initial affect toward the politician
discourages the critical evaluation and then only promotes the
idea of funniness of the comic message.
On the basis of the above studies it seems useful to consider
different types of humor and parody and specify their different
features, as Holbert et al. (2011) does.
PARODY AS MORAL AND AFFECTIVE
PRIMING
An underestimated determinant of the effectiveness of parody
in terms of political persuasion are emotional factors, and in
particular the effect of negative and moral emotions (Tangney
et al., 2007; Castelfranchi, 2015; D’Errico and Poggi, 2016) caused
by different acts of discredit.
Emotions, in fact, can be considered as a first evaluation of
parodies, and in particular the negative ones can be an alert
in a “moral” sense: for example, indignation and contempt
toward a discredited politician, especially when a parody heavily
emphasizes potential harm and negativity, can have a role in
the persuasion process. Several experiments demonstrated that
affect is associated to a network of coherent memories (Bower
et al., 1981) and also that negative emotions and mood can
lead to more systematic information processing (Sinclair and
Mark, 1995; Forgas, 2007); in the same vein, the negative and
unmoral information carried by a critical parody can elicit
negative emotions and so moral schemas (Ben-Nun Bloom, 2014)
that can favor a more analytic processing and strict evaluation
of the politician’s behavior. More specifically, Ben-Nun Bloom
(2014) suggested that moral emotions like disgust increase moral
conviction and a harder moral judgment, especially among
political opponents.
Starting from these experimental evidences, the goal of our
work is to test if parody – or particular types of it – can work as a
moral and affective priming in political persuasion. In this sense
we presume that political parody can be a moral priming since,
bringing out a target’s flaws, it indirectly elicits moral standards
and then negative moral emotions. In the remainder of this
paper we illustrate an experimental study mainly investigating
this issue. But before going into it, Section “Evaluation, Discredit,
and Ridicule” illustrates how the notions of evaluation, discredit,
satire, and parody are defined in the socio-cognitive model from
which our hypothesis stems.
EVALUATION, DISCREDIT, AND
RIDICULE
A communicative behavior frequently exploited in the political
arena by political opponents – whether politicians themselves, or
political critics (journalists, satiric writers, comedians) – is one of
casting discredit over each other. According to a socio-cognitive
model of mind, emotions, social interaction, and communication
based on the notions of goal and belief (Castelfranchi, 1995;
Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2000; Poggi, 2007; Poggi et al., 2011,
2012; Poggi and D’Errico, 2013), to cast discredit over some X
means to spoil the image of X before some people (D’Errico et al.,
2012; D’Errico and Poggi, 2013). X’s image is the set of evaluative
and non-evaluative beliefs that people have concerning X (Miceli
and Castelfranchi, 2000). An evaluative belief (evaluation) is a
belief about whether and how much some object, event or person
has (and hence may provide someone with) the power to achieve
some goal. While planning to achieve our goals we generally
evaluate anything and anyone with respect to several criteria
(i.e., goals), utilitarian, moral, esthetic, judging it as good/bad,
useful/useless, beautiful/ugly, intelligent/stupid. . . We evaluate
something positively when it has/gives us the power for some
goal, and negative either when it lacks power (inadequacy) or
when it has the power of thwarting goals (noxiousness; Miceli and
Castelfranchi, 2000), e.g., “stupid” vs. “bad.”
In the political contest, discredit of politicians is often
exploited by other politicians, journalists, comedians in order to
political persuasion. Since we are persuaded by what a Persuader
tells us (logos), but also by how the Persuader is (ethos), every
politician tries to project a positive image of himself, while not
to have people persuaded by his opponent, he may spoil the
opponent’s image (discredit him) against three criteria (D’Errico
et al., 2012): benevolence (trustworthiness, disinterest, honesty,
morality), competence (expertise, knowledge, reasoning, and
planning skills), and dominance (skill of winning in competitions,
influencing others, imposing one’s will). Discredit may be cast
through various “discrediting moves”: accusation, criticism,
insult, and ridiculization (Poggi et al., 2012; D’Errico et al., 2014).
Ridiculization – making fun of another – is a Sender P’s
communicative act that conveys a negative evaluation of a Target
T before an Audience A, aimed at “moralistic aggression” toward
T (Bischof, 1980; Castelfranchi, 1998; Poggi, 2011; Poggi et al.,
2012), in order to sanction his a-social behavior, sometimes even
with pedagogical functions. In making fun of T, P conveys a
negative evaluation of T for lack of power, that contrasts with
T’s pretense of superiority. Such contrast between pretense of
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power and actual lack of power, that is, though, not threatening
for P, can elicit laughter, thus resulting in a sense of superiority.
P’s and A’s laughing after T together causes three effects: (a)
P and A feel superior to T, being above his inadequacy, and
not threatened by it; (b) this common superiority strengthens
the social bonds between P and A, through the shared emotion
of laughing together, their feeling similar to each other and
different from T, and a sense of alliance and complicity; (c) with
image and self-image attacked, T experiences shame, humiliation,
abasement, s/he feels different and rejected. All this may be P’s
deliberate intention, and is the social function of ridiculization.
This is why making fun of another is a peculiar discrediting move,
typically exploited by political satire, that has parody as one of its
weapons.
A SOCIO-COGNITIVE MODEL OF
PARODY
In terms of the notions above, a parody can be defined as
a communicative act – a text or a verbal or multimodal
communicative behavior (a discourse, a poem, a song, a film,
a fiction) – that performs a distorted imitation of another text
or multimodal behavior, with the aim of amusing and eliciting
laughter about either the behavior or the one who performs it.
A possible goal of such eliciting laughter and amusement can be
to make fun of that person or behavior aiming to cast discredit
on it. A text, a discourse, a rite, an institution, and finally a
person may all be an object of parody. Often this teasing practice
is exploited to achieve that abasement of power that exorcizes
hate against powerful people and protects them from rebellion
of those in a lower position: therefore, just like pupils make
parodies of their teachers, satiric comedians make parodies of
politicians, sometimes simply to have fun, sometimes to highlight
their political or human flaws, and thus to lower other people’s
compliance with them.
Parody as Distorted Imitation
In the parody of a person, the Parodist P imitates a Target T
by reproducing his/her traits and/or communicative or non-
communicative behaviors, but in a distorted, for example an
exaggerated or misleading way, that highlights the Target’s flaws;
to do so the parodist must single out the most characterizing
features of T’s physical traits or behaviors, and imitate them while
exaggerating or anyway changing them in such a way as to make
them appear ridicule (Poggi and D’Errico, 2013).
The imitation performed in a parody is distorted because the
goal of the Parodist is to highlight the Target’s flaw: therefore the
Target’s traits are exaggerated and made grotesque.
Actually, since the imitation is distorted, the need to make
the Target recognizable is even stronger than in bare imitation.
So the parodist must effectively convey two distinct kinds of
information, one concerning the very identity of the Target,
and one regarding the features subject to criticism: while the
latter must be distorted, the former must be imitated the most
faithful way. In both he can do so with the help of allusion, that
is, letting the Audience infer the information he refers to, but
without mentioning it explicitly. Generally the Target is made
recognizable through a suit he typically wears, a make up that
makes the Parodist’s face and hair more similar to the Target’s,
or the imitation of his voice and regional accent. As to the
flaw, since often it has been evidenced by a particular event
or episode, it is evoked through allusion to that episode. For
example, in a parody pointing at the organizational unsuitability
of Rome Mayor Gianni Alemanno during an unprecedented
snow, to remind that the event occurred in Rome the Parodist
Max Paiella, imitating Alemanno, is presented on the background
of Coliseum.
Surface and Deep Parody
Yet, there are two ways to distort the imitation, differing for the
extent to which the Parodist’s traits or behaviors are far from the
Target’s actual ones. These two different levels of distortion result
in two different types of parody, that as distinguished in previous
works (Poggi and D’Errico, 2013) we call “surface” and “deep”
parody.
An example to clarify the difference is in the parodies of an
Italian right-wing politician, Renato Brunetta, who is very short
and very arrogant and aggressive against leftists. In one of them
the (left-wing) comedian Maurizio Crozza simply represents him
by standing on his knees. This way he simply exaggerates the trait
of having short legs. Other behaviors typical of Brunetta, that give
the idea of his aggressive and arrogant communication and can
be easily distorted by simple exaggeration, are his habit of urging
the interlocutor by repeating the same word or statement two
or three times, and the gesture of approaching his index fingers
while arguing. To perform a “surface” parody, that is, a simple
distortion by exaggeration of these behaviors, it is sufficient for
Crozza to repeat the same word many times, or do the same
gesture of index fingers approaching more often than usual, even
at points of the discourse in which Brunetta would never make
that gesture.
Yet besides doing so, Crozza also makes “deep” parodies
of Brunetta: for example when he represents him with a gun
and a helmet while groveling on the ground like a guerrillero.
In this case, to render Brunetta’s aggressiveness he performs a
re-categorization of him: he finds a category of persons that
is typically characterized by this trait, guerrilleros, and shifts
Brunetta from the category of politician to this new category.
One more “deep” parody by another comedian, Max Paiella,
of Fabrizio Cicchitto: this politician, formerly a most devoted
member of the left-wing Socialist Party and of his leader Bettino
Craxi, later became a Member of Parliament in a right-wing party,
Forza Italia, and proved totally devoted and submissive to its
leader Silvio Berlusconi. Paiella (in 2011, with Berlusconi being
the Prime Minister) represents Cicchitto on the background of
the luxurious Hall of the Italian Parliament, wearing, below his
jacket, a long white pinny, and while listing the laws to be
approved as if they were the items of a restaurant menu.
Let us track the cognitive processes leading to this parodistic
representation of Cicchitto. First the political Parodist singles out
the Target’s characterizing feature to make fun of (the political
flaw): his being a very submissive politician. Then he finds
a category of persons different from one the Target belongs
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(politicians) and prototypically characterized by that feature (the
category of waiters); so he represents a Parliament member as a
waiter. Such “deep” parody consists in a re-categorization of the
Target, from his own category to another that has the Target’s flaw
as its most characterizing feature.
Therefore, the ideation of a deep parody as opposed to a
surface one implies a more complex cognitive process both on
the production and the comprehension side. The Addressee of
a deep parody, to fully understand its implications, starting
from the re-categorization of the target (waiter) must retrieve
its characterizing feature (submissive) and apply it to the actual
category of the Target (Parliament members), and finally to the
Target himself (Cicchitto is submissive).
Once caught the analogy between the two categories, the
Addressee should map each feature of the new category onto
the Target’s, seeing the waiter as Cicchitto, the restaurant as the
Parliament, the meals of the menu as the laws to be approved,
and the Chief of the Restaurant, who determines the meals to be
cooked, as Berlusconi, who decides the laws to feed to the people.
Only once reconstructed all this information can the Addressee
fully understand the political criticism borne by the parody.
PARODY AS AFFECTIVE/MORAL
PRIMING IN POLITICAL PERSUASION.
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
The goal of our work is to investigate the effects of surface and
deep parodies on the Addressee, in terms of the emotions elicited
and of the resulting evaluation of the Target.
A Study on How Parodies Affect
Emotions and Target Evaluations
We conducted an experimental study on different types of
parody, focusing on three research questions:
(1) Our first aim was to test the psychological reality of
the distinction between surface and deep parody, and to
demonstrate that both imply different processes from bare
imitation.
(2) Our second hypothesis is that surface and deep parody
differ for the kinds of emotions they elicit, and/or for their
relative intensity.
(3) The third hypothesis is that surface and deep parody
have different effects on the evaluation of the Target more
specifically, we hypothesized.
(4) That negative and moral emotions cause a more negative
evaluation of the Target, compared to positive emotions or
non-moral emotions.
(5) That deep parody, as opposed to surface parody, can
promote more critical thoughts toward politicians and
concerning politics in general.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
To test these hypotheses, we designed a monofactorial between
subjects experiment with one independent variable with three
levels being three different representations of the same Target
politician: a bare imitation, a surface parody, and a deep parody.
The dependent variables were the emotions elicited in the
Addressee, and the induced evaluation of the Target, possibly
including negative and critical thoughts.
Hundred and eighty three participants were submitted a semi-
structured on line questionnaire after viewing a video according
to three different conditions corresponding to the independent
variable “type of representation” (simple imitation – as a control
variable – surface, and deep parody).
The sample was balanced and composed by 53% women, the
majority having a high school degree (54%) or a University degree
(26%), age of 37 (SD = 15,9), and political orientation mainly
oriented toward left party (49%), compared to 20% oriented
toward right party, 15% oriented to “five stars movement” and
14% to center-party.
Stimulus Material
Three video-stimuli were selected among a wider range of videos
of Italian imitators and parodists downloaded from youtube; they
were analyzed by two independent judges as to their multimodal
communication (Poggi and D’Errico, 2013), and classified as
imitation, surface, or deep parody, based on the following
conditions:
1 For simple imitation: (1) faithful reproduction of bodily
and verbal traits and behaviors typical of a real politician;
(2) comic act;
2 For surface parody: (1) imitation of some bodily and
verbal traits and behaviors typical of a real politician; (2)
distortion of the imitation; (3) comic act; (4) critical act; (5)
possible reference to a specific event triggering the critical
act;
3 For deep parody: (1) imitation of some bodily and verbal
traits and behaviors typical of a real politician; (2) re-
categorization of the politician; (3) imitation of a scenery
and/or body and verbal traits and behaviors characterizing
the new category; (4) comic act; (5) critical act.
The videos selected by taking into account the conditions
above were:
1 Condition 1, simple imitation: an almost unknown
imitator (actually, a right-wing member of Parliament)
faithfully imitating the right-wing Minister of Economy,
Giulio Tremonti. His most faithfully represented features
were gray hair and his accent and pronunciation,
characterized by his lisp “r”;
2 Condition 2, surface parody: Tremonti imitated by the left-
wing comedian Corrado Guzzanti while computing, in a
very hectic way, on an electric calculator (an allusion to his
being the Minister of Economy) and repeatedly uttering
a curse that, including an “r”, gave Guzzanti a chance to
funnily exaggerate Tremonti’s lisp “r”;
3 Condition 3, deep parody: Guzzanti, representing
Tremonti, dressed in a costume of the 18th century, then
re-categorized as a French King (perhaps Louis the XVI),
bored to hear the people’s voices out of his sumptuous
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palace, and uttering sentences like Marie Antoinette’s
at the time of the French Revolution. Tremonti was so
re-interpreted as an autocratic king totally careless about
the people’s economic problems.
All participants, assigned each to one of the three conditions,
after viewing the corresponding video, were asked to fill in
a questionnaire of 34 open and multiple choice questions,
investigating the emotions and evaluations elicited by the video
(along with cognitive aspects like comprehension of its meaning
and recognition of the character, that is the object of another
work, D’Errico and Poggi, 2016). At the beginning of the
questionnaire, a distinction was explicitly made between the
fictional character represented by the imitator or parodist (let
us call it C, for example the funny Tremonti pressing on
the keys of the calculator) and the Real Person represented
(RP: the real Tremonti, also called the Parodied Politician).
Quantitative questions asked to rate the investigated aspect
on a 5 point Likert scale. Questions on emotional aspects
investigated the extent to which emotions were elicited by the
video (joy, bitterness, sadness, interest, amusement, boredom,
pleasure, enthusiasm, displeasure, indignation) or felt toward
the Character (pity, tenderness, sense of pathetic, contempt,
sympathy, antipathy, indignation, admiration), and asked what
moments in the video, if any, were comic. Other questions asked
to evaluate the video (well done, ugly, expressive, hard, strong,
amusing, exciting, exceptional, delicate, elegant, attractive,
interesting, moving, pleasant), the Character and the Real Person
(negative, indifferent, amusing, proactive, competent, dangerous,
strong, credible, enthusiasm inducing, stupid, convincing, false,
charismatic, astute).
A final question inquired the Participant’s political orientation.
Measures
Manipulation Check
The manipulation of the type of parody was checked by a
multiple choice question “How would you classify this video?”
with possible answers (1) an imitation, (2) a simple parody close
to reality, (3) a complex parody far from reality. A chi square test
evidences a significant effect [χ(3) = 39,54; p > 0.000] of correct
answers: the video in condition 1 was classified as imitation by
64% of participants (vs. as surface parody by 36%, as deep parody
by 10%); in condition 2, 42% classified it as a “simple” parody
(32% as deep parody and 24% as imitation); in condition 3,58%
classified it as a complex parody far from reality (35% as surface
and 7% as imitation).
Answers to the scales of emotions were analyzed by factorial
analysis to extract positive and negative emotions. The analysis
extracts two factors (positive and negative) that explain 46% of
variance; reliability alpha is equal to 0.067. In the positive scale
we sum joy, fun, enthusiasm and pleasure (M = 2,03, SD = 0,96;
α = 0.074) while in negative, along with sadness, we sum
the negative moral emotions of bitterness (Poggi and D’Errico,
2010b), indignation and contempt (M = 2,59, SD = 1,14;
α= 0.070).
The evaluation of Character (the represented Tremonti)
and of Real Person (the real Tremonti, i.e., the parodied
politician) was rated by 14 items that cover the persuasive
dimensions of competence, benevolence, dominance (Poggi and
D’Errico, 2010a). A factor analysis extracted three factors: one
of competence (competent, active, credible, convincing, stupid
reversed), one of negative benevolence (dangerous, negative,
false, and astute) and the last one a factor of induced funniness
(amusing, exciting, indifferent reversed); in the case of the
character, the first factor explains the 25% of variance, 17%
the second one, and the third 9%. As to evaluation of the real
politician, the variance explained is for the first factor 33%, for
the second (negative as to benevolence) 18% and the third 8%.
For the purposes of the study we will analyze mostly the second
dimension so the four items were analyzed in order to have a
unique mean of “negative as to benevolence of the character”
(M = 2,65, SD = 0,94; reliability analysis: α = 0.069) and
“negative evaluation of the real politician” (M = 2,73, SD= 1,02;
α= 0.074).
Negative/Critical Thoughts
The dependent variable of intensity and target of critical thoughts
was assessed respectively by measuring the answers to the
question “how much negative/positive were your thoughts after
the video” and by coding open answers to the question “What
are your reflections after seeing this video?” 135 out of 183
answers were coded in four categories with an increasing
level of generality: (a) no reflection (when participants declare
that they have no particular thoughts); (b) distrust or negative
thoughts on the politician (i.e., “he is a negative person,” “he is
not trustworthy”); (c) negative thoughts or distrust concerning
the socio-cultural situation (i.e., “I’m thinking of the negative
situation of our country,” “if they spent our money for
their privileges our negative situation will never change”; (d)
reflections concerning politics in general (“it reflects the real
political situation, they are all lazy/slackers,” “Im thinking of
politicians who defend only their own interests and not those of
laypeople”).
Hypotheses
Taking up Holbert et al.’s, (2011) conclusion concerning the
different effects of juvenalian and horatian satire, our hypothesis
is that parody can be an affective priming not only in a positive
sense (Nabi et al., 2007) but also in a negative sense, depending
on its features, namely its being a surface vs. deep parody (Poggi
and D’Errico, 2013).
We first of all hypothesize that parody, different from a
simple imitation, can induce a mixed mood, composed by
positive emotions for the comic act, but also negative and
more typically moral emotions, and more so especially when
the negative features of a politician are re-categorized in terms
of another extreme character with exaggerated features (i.e., a
dictator, a fighter), finally characterizing him as belonging to a
non-politician category, as is the case in deep parody (Poggi and
D’Errico, 2013).
Our hypothesis further holds that the positive vs. negative
affective priming, in its turn, can influence (1) the evaluation of
the Character, (2) the evaluation of the Real Person (the parodied
politician), and (3) the political judgment and associated critical
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thinking; in other words people tend to create congruency
between their emotional state and their evaluation of other people
(Forgas, 2006).
We finally predict that the affective priming, coherently with
the “congruity hypothesis,” will mainly affect people with a
political orientation opposite to one of the parodied politician.
In our case our prediction is that, facing the parody of a
right-wing politician, left-wing participants will be more affected
by negative emotions and similarly more negative will be
the evaluation both of the parody Character and of the Real
politician.
Results
All the presented results are significant; all other results will be
not taken into account in the following description. An ANOVA
analysis of Type of Parody, illustrated below in Table 1, shows
significant differences between conditions: the positive emotions
joy, fun, pleasure and enthusiasm are higher mostly in surface
parody compared to imitation and deep parody, while negative
ones like bitterness, contempt, indignation and sadness are higher
in the deep parody condition. Surprisingly, negative emotions in
general are basically higher than the positive ones (2,71 vs. 2,01;
p < 0.05).
In general also for what concerns the evaluation of the
Character (Tremonti as represented by the parodist Guzzanti) an
ANOVA shows that in the surface parody condition, coherently
with the positive emotions previously described, participants
evaluate the Character more positively (amusing, exciting, and
also competent) than in imitation and deep parody. This
result seems coherent with the so called “just a joke effect”
(Nabi et al., 2007) in that the funnier the video is perceived,
the more positive the Character evaluation. Furthermore, the
means of the negative items, negative, dangerous and astute
tend to be higher than the positive ones, and summing
them we can see a good difference: 2,7 vs. 2,2 (p < 0.05
at t-test paired); only the “stupid” item is higher in the
surface condition (coherently with the dimension of discredit
evoked by the surface parody). Thus, parody remains a
funny genre, but nonetheless elicits negative evaluations of the
character.
As to the evaluation of the Real Person (the Parodied
politician), the ANOVA shows that the condition affects two
items only: negative and astute (Table 2), this last dimension
evoked by the deep parody condition, where Tremonti/King
Louis is discredited for his lack of benevolence. However, in
the deep parody condition the parodied politician is evaluated
as more negative and as more astute than in the surface and
imitation condition (negative 3,29 vs. 2,95 in surface and 2,37
in imitation; astute 3,21 vs. 2,74 in surface and 2,53 in imitation
condition; p < 0.05 and p < 0.05).
Parody, Emotions Elicited, Evaluation of the
Character and of the Real Person: a Mediational
Analysis
To outline the relation between video, emotions and evaluation
of the Character and of the Real Person, we performed
three significant mediational analyses. To test the mediational
hypothesis, a series of regression analyses were performed
following the procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).
This procedure consists of a three-step series of regression
analyses. In the first regression, the independent variable
is associated with the dependent variable; in the second
regression, the independent variable has to be associated with the
hypothesized mediator. The third phase consists of a regression
where the effects of both independent variable and mediator on
the dependent variable are tested. Mediation is demonstrated
when the addition of the mediator variable into the third
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of emotions (mean and SD).
Imitation (n = 60) Surface (n = 65) Deep (n = 57) Total p
Joy 1,28 (0.6) 1,94 (1,2) 1,79 (1,1) 1,68 <0.002
Fun 1,93 (1) 3,09 (1.4) 3,01 (1.1) 2,69 <0.000
Pleasure 1,63 (0.8) 2,22 (1.2) 1,74 (1) 2,01 <0.05
Enthusiasm 1,38 (0.64) 1,95 (1.2) 1,89 (0.9) 1,75 <0.003
Bitterness 3,01 (1.3) 2,66 (1.3) 3,14 (1.2) 2,95 <0.05
Contempt 2,34 (1) 2,38 (1.1) 2,98 (1) 2,55 <0.05
Indignation 2,63 (1.4) 2,46 (1.5) 3,07(1,3) 2,95 <0.05
Sadness 2,45 (1.3) 1,97 (1) 2,56 (1.3) 2,45 <0.05
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics of Character evaluation (mean and SD).
Imitation (n = 60) Surface (n = 65) Deep (n = 57) Total p
Amusing 2,15 (0.9) 3,23 (1,2) 3.02 (1.2) 2,82 0.000
Exciting 1,37 (0.6) 1,66 (0.8) 1,95 (0.9) 1,65 0.02
Competent 2,12 (0.8) 2,34 (0.9) 1,91 (1) 2,13 0.01
Negative 2,7 (1.2) 3,22 (1.2) 3,49 (1.2) 3,13 0.003
Dangerous 1,93 (1.1) 2,52 (1.2) 2,63 (1.3) 2,36 0.01
Astute 2,48 (1) 2,52 (1,1) 3,12 (1,2) 2,63 0.003
Stupid 2,27 (1.1) 2,95 (0.9) 2,89 (0.8) 2,77 0.002
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regression equation substantially decreases or eliminates the
previously significant relation between the independent variable
and the dependent variable. The relations involved in the
mediations are also tested by means of Sobel Test and they are
both significant (1) T: 2,15; p < 0,03; (2) T: 2,57, p < 0.010.
Figure 1 shows how the experimental condition (1: imitation,
2: surface, 3: deep) is significantly related to the moral emotion
of indignation, the stricter the parody is, the more indignation
participants feel (β: 0.026). Indignation correlates with a negative
evaluation of the real politician’s benevolence (β: 0.025), and
their mediation also lowers the direct relation between type of
video and negative evaluation of the politician’s benevolence
(p:n.s.), being a good moderator. So, the stricter the parody, the
more negative moral emotions people tend to feel, and the more
negative the evaluation of the parodied politician.
The second mediation shows how indignation is more
strongly associated to the negative evaluation of the real
politician’s benevolence when they are mediated by negative
evaluation of the Character’s benevolence (β: 0.033). This
mediation highlights that indignation elicited by deep parody
also affects the represented politician, and this evaluation can
mediate the overall evaluation of the real politician: in a sense,
when the indignation is high also the pleasure and funniness of
the represented Character decrease (Figure 2).
Critical Thoughts and the Target of Distrust
In order to test the effect of the video on critical thinking, at the
end of the questionnaire we asked “how much negative/positive
were your thoughts after the video.” The differences in answers
were significant to an ANOVA [F(2,181) = 3,696; p < 0.025],
in that participants evaluate their thoughts more negatively in
the deep parody condition than in the other two conditions
(4,11 vs. 3,74 in surface parody and 3,5 in imitation) (Figure
3). No significant difference on positive thoughts between
conditions, but an interesting result is that when comparing
positivity and negativity of the participant’s thoughts we can
say that, surprisingly, positive thoughts means are significantly
lower than the negative ones (1,57 vs. 3,77; p < 0.05 at t-test
paired).
While usually in previous experiments (Nabi et al., 2007;
LaMarre et al., 2014) the researchers collected a dependent
variable called “counter-arguing,” the agreement on the critical
part of the parody’s message, in our study we wonder if
parody affects thought not directly connected to the specific
message of the parody, but more in general the amount of
negative/critical thoughts toward the politician, or the overall
socio-cultural situation or more in general politics. This might
be read in terms of distrust and cynicism (Cappella and
Jamieson, 1997; Castelfranchi, 2013). The answers to the question
concerning negative/critical thinking, “What are your reflections
after seeing this video?,” were coded into four categories (no
reflection; distrust on the politician; distrust concerning the
socio-cultural situation; distrust concerning politics in general);
on the total of the codified answers across conditions the
highest percentages are on the socio-economic situation (33%)
and on politics in general (34%), demonstrating a general
level of distrust, and political cynicism (just 15% have no
particular thoughts and 18% have ones on that particular
politician).
Considering the manipulation, a chi square test reports a
significant effect for type of video [χ(4) = 27,51; p > 0.00]: in
the deep parody condition critical thoughts show a higher level
of generality than in other conditions. Deep parody promotes
mainly thoughts strictly linked to distrust in politics (51%)
and on the socio-economic situation (37%), but to a lesser
extent concerning the parodied politician (8%) or no thought in
particular (4%). On the contrary in the surface parody condition
thoughts linked to the character (30,60%) are higher than in
the other cases; in the imitation condition participants have no
critical thoughts (35%).
The negative evaluation of the real politician’s benevolence
significantly affects the negative thoughts at the end of the video
and the target of distrust as demonstrated by a linear regression
(Table 3): when the politician is evaluated more dangerous, astute,
negative and false by participants, the level of negative reflections
and general distrust tend to increase (1 no distrust – 4: distrust
toward politics).
Political Orientation
As to political orientation, taking into account that in this study
the Target politician was the right-wing Minister Tremonti, we
analyzed the potential main and interaction effects on dependent
FIGURE 1 | Mediational regression analyses of type of video and indignation on negative evaluation of character’s benevolence. The type of Video
variable was processed as a progressive number 1 = imitation, 2 = surface, 3 = deep associated to the progressive “severity of parody,” so the positive relation
must be read as follows: when “severity of parody” increases indignation increases too ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Solid lines between variables denote direct paths
between two variables. Dotted lines denote paths when moral and negative emotions are included as mediator. Values denote standardized Beta weights.
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FIGURE 2 | Mediational regression analyses of indignation and negative evaluation of character’s benevolence on negative evaluation of real
politician’s benevolence. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Solid lines between variables denote direct paths between two variables. Dotted lines denote
paths when negative evaluation is included as mediator. Values denote standardized Beta weights.
FIGURE 3 | Target of distrust∗conditions.
variables and only two main effects resulted significant. An
ANOVA shows a main effect on bitterness due to parody
[F(3,143) = 3,052; p < 0.05, η2 = 0.45]: leftists feel more
bitterness (3,16) than participants siding with the center (2,85),
the right (2,8) and five stars movement (2,6). The case of
right-wing participants can be explained by the “congruity
effect” (Boukes et al., 2015): the more congruent the political
orientation the fewer negative emotions are elicited by parody.
The case of five stars movement, a party extremely opposed to
the parodied politician (Tremonti) can be explained by their
cynicism toward traditional political parties (but a next study
will have to further investigate this). The negative evaluation
of politicians too presents a significant main effect for political
orientation [F(3,143)= 2,858; p< 0.035, η2 = 0.48]: membership
in the same party as the parodied politician’s determines less
negative evaluation. So leftists (3,08), center-wing (3) and five
stars movement participants (2,88) present a more negative
evaluation of real Tremonti than the right-wing ones (2,4)
(Table 4).
TABLE 3 | Regression predicting negative thoughts and target of distrust.
Evaluation of Real politician’s Negative
benevolence
D.V B SE p
Negative thoughts 0.28 0.25 0.01
Target of distrust 0.46 0.33 0.04
The Table illustrates: unstandardized coefficient (b), coefficient with standard errors
(SE), and probabilities (p).
The Variable negative thoughts is on a Likert scale (1–5) while Target of distrust was
processed as a progressive number 1 = no distrust, 2 = distrust toward politician,
3 = distrust toward socio-economic situation, 4 = distrust toward politics, so
the positive relation must be read as follows: the negative evaluation of the real
politician’s benevolence also increases “generality of distrust.”
These two main effects are in line with possible expectations,
but an interesting result is the interaction effect between political
orientation and type of representation [F(3,143)= 2,328; p< 0.025
η2 = 0.93] on the evaluation of the politician, that shows
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TABLE 4 | Descriptive statistics of bitterness and negative evaluation of
the real politician’s benevolence (mean and SD).
Left
(n = 73)
Center
(n = 20)
Right
(n = 30)
Five stars
(n = 25)
Bitterness 3,16 (1.2) 2,85 (1.3) 2,8 (1.2) 2,6 (1.2)
Negative evaluation
of real politician’s
benevolence
3,08 (1.3) 3 (1.4) 2,4 (1.3) 2,88 (1.3)
FIGURE 4 | Political orientation∗conditions on politician’s negative
evaluation.
how deep parody determines an increase in negative evaluation
particularly on the part of political congruent participants
(rightists: in surface condition 1,25 vs. deep parody 2,83) different
from leftists that are quite constant across conditions (Figure 4).
We can deduct that right voters (congruent with the parodied
politician) are more affected by a deep parody than left, center or
five star movement voters; in this case they evaluate the politician
as more dangerous, but this evaluation does not impact on their
level of trust.
STUDY TWO. WHAT’S THE ROLE OF
GENDER IN THE EFFECTS OF PARODY?
To go more in depth into the persuasive effects of parody, we
checked if results concerning felt emotions and evaluation of
the character and of the real politician change when either the
Parodist or the Target politician is female.
In this case, is parody still an affective and moral priming or
not?
We conducted an experimental study on different types of
representation, comparing the effect when the politician is a male
vs. a female (performed by a same gender parodist).
Considering that the roles of power, in politicians, are
mainly masculine (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988; Burr, 2002; Paxton and
Kunovich, 2003), particularly in the Italian context (Gelli, 2009),
we expect that parody as an aggressive act, will affect male
politicians more than female ones: first because politics is not a
female stereotypical field, so their role is seen as less relevant,
and secondly because females are under-represented among
politicians, so an attack on them, throught a parodistic act, can
be seen just as a risible comic act:
We hypothesize that parody as an act of discredit will be less
effective in female than in male condition and in particular
(1) Emotions will be more positively oriented in female
parody than in male one;
(2) Evaluation of the character and of the real politician will
be more positive in female than in male condition.
Material and Methods
To test these hypotheses, we designed a bifactorial between
subject experiment with two independent variables, type of
representation and the politician’s (and Parodist’s) gender: the
first with three leves, bare imitation, surface and deep parody,
the second with two levels, male vs. female politician (and
Parodist). The dependent variables and measures were, like in the
first study, emotions elicited in the addressee, evaluation of the
character, and evaluation of the real politician.
Two hundred and thirty one participants filled in a half-
structured on line questionnaire after viewing a video according
to the six conditions corresponding to the independent variables.
The sample was composed by 63% women, the majority with
a high school degree 64%, age of 33,4 (SD = 15,7) and mostly
oriented toward left (37,2%; 11,7% toward center-party, 17,3%
toward right party and 16,8% toward five stars movement; the
remaining participants declared “no political orientation”).
Stimulus Material
The three stimuli in male condition were the same of the first
study; while in female condition we selected a right-wing female
politician, Giorgia Meloni as Target of three videos, analyzed
by two independent judges and coded as (1) pure imitation, (2)
surface parody, and (3) deep parody.
The conditions were the following:
1. Condition 1, simple imitation: the left-wing comedian
Sabina Guzzanti imitates Giorgia Meloni, right-wing
candidate to Mayor of Rome, who is pregnant and whose
delivery will exactly coincide with the end of the political
campaign and her possible election to Mayor. Guzzanti
represents Meloni while looking for a babysitter, asking
for a babysitting 24 h a day, and complaining that a
Rumanian babysitter (toward whom she is has racist
biases) would charge her 150 euros a day for that.
2. Condition 2, surface parody: Comedian Paola
Minaccioni makes fun of hectic Giorgia Meloni’s
habit of showing as a super-woman: she represents her
while throwing a weigh of 2000 kilos, viewing things on
the back of her head, cooking a chicken in 7 min. . .
3. Condition 3, deep parody: Sabina Guzzanti acts Meloni,
on the background of a helicopter, dressed in a
camouflage like a soldier, and while complaining about
an invasion by Moroccans, for instance Balthasar with his
camel, who occupy even the crib.
Results
All the presented results are significant; others results will be
not taken into account in the following description, except for
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some cases close to significance. Results concerning emotions
point out that in male condition participants feel more bitterness,
indignation, interest and less boredom (p < 0.05) than in female
condition. The male parody activates participants (less boredom
and more interest) and, congruent with the starting hypotheses,
it causes more negative moral emotions like indignation, because
politics is represented mostly as a masculine domain (Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1988) and thus it carries more expectations on male
politicians (see Table 5). Moreover, an ANOVA points out an
interaction effect between type of representation and gender on
the moral emotion of indignation [F(2,230) = 4,121; p < 0.015,
η2 = 0.72]: while in male condition, the stronger the parody the
more indignation participants feel, in female more indignation
occurs in imitation and in surface parody. This might be due
to the fact that not so much aggressiveness is necessary in the
parody, given that female politicians are devoid of decisional
power (Figure 5). Among less significant results are the positive
emotions, that are slightly lower than the negative ones, and
higher in female condition: like in the case of joy (p= 0.14).
The gender trend in parody is also confirmed by results on
the evaluation of the character and of the real politician, because
negative – and dangerous – features are attributed, regardless
of the type of representation, more to the male character than
to the female one (Table 6). Evaluation of the real politician
too, after viewing the parody, is more negative and less amusing
in male condition than in female condition. Moreover, also
in this case another result close to significance is the positive
evaluation of the character, seen as more exciting in female
condition (p = 0.11), even if this is lower than for negative items
(1,65 in male condition vs. 2.35 in female one). In a certain
TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics of emotions∗ Parodied politician’s gender
(mean and SD).
Man (n = 182) Woman (n = 48) Total p
Bitterness 2,95 (1.3) 2,17 (1,2) 2,56 <0.000
Indignation 2,71 (1.3) 2,23 (1.4) 2,47 <0.05
Interest 2,5 (0.9) 2,02 (1.1) 2,26 <0.05
Boredom 2,13 (1.2) 2,54 (1.3) 2,33 <0.05
FIGURE 5 | Type of parody∗Parodied politician’s gender on Indignation.
TABLE 6 | Descriptive statistics of character and real politician evaluation∗
Parodied politician’s gender (mean and SD).
Man (n = 182) Woman (n = 48) Total p
Character evaluation
Negative 3,13 (1.3) 2,75 (1,2) 2,94 <0.05
Dangerous 2,36 (1.3) 1,96 (1.2) 2,16 <0.05
Real politician evaluation
Amusing 1,73 (0.9) 2,08 (1.1) 1,9 <0.05
Dangerous 2,47 (1.2) 1,85 (1.3) 2,16 <0.001
sense, parody as a moral priming seems more effective on male
politicians, while in women it remains just a joke. In particular
in male condition, deep parody affects the evaluation of the real
politician as more astute (3,21) than in imitation and surface
parody (2,23 and 2,88), while the female is evaluated astute in the
average across conditions. This interaction effect is significant at
an ANOVA analysis [F(2,230) = 3,564; p < 0.05, η2 = 0.61] and
it demonstrates that enhancing discredit toward a politician by
means of parody, worsens the evaluation of male politicians and
to a lesser extent that of female ones (Figure 6).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was twofold: first to investigate the
persuasive effects determined by two types of political parody,
surface and deep, differing for their multimodal – bodily and
verbal – arrangement (Poggi and D’Errico, 2013) but, before that,
by their different cognitive structure. Surface and deep parody
respectively result from different levels of distortion stemming
of a different categorization of the behavior or personality of the
parodied politician. In surface parody the distortion is relatively
light since it lets the Target be clearly recognizable as a member of
his source category; in deep parody instead, distortion gives rise
to a re-categorization (Rosch, 1973), hence to a different person,
for instance one disguised as an absolutist king or a submissive
servant.
In the second place, while the great part of literature mainly
points at the role of positive emotions in the discounting process
FIGURE 6 | Type of representation∗Parodied politician’s gender on
Astute.
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of parody, our goal was to investigate the role of negative and
moral emotions in the evaluation of the politician and in the
consequent persuasive effect. Results evidence how parody in
general elicits more negative than positive emotions, and how the
two types of parody elicit them in different ways. While surface
parody mainly elicits positive emotions and presumably a “just
joke effect” (Nabi et al., 2007) thanks to its focusing on the comic
effects of parody, deep parody mainly elicits negative emotions
like sadness and bitterness, and moral emotions like indignation
and contempt. Surface and deep parody therefore exert a different
affective priming that also reverberates on the evaluation of the
Character: while surface parody makes him appear more amusing
and exciting, deep parody (that in our case mainly discredits the
Target’s benevolence) makes the character less amusing but more
competent, dangerous, negative and astute. Moreover, results
clearly evidence how participants, after viewing the deep parody,
evaluate the Character as more negative and astute than the Real
Politician.
The relationship among types of parody, negative emotions
and Character evaluation has then been made explicit by a
mediational model (Baron and Kenny, 1986): deep parody
elicits negative moral emotions, in particular indignation, that
turn into a negative evaluation of the Character (Figure 1),
further significantly related with a negative evaluation of the
Real Politician. Such relation is stronger depending on political
congruity (Boukes et al., 2015): in our case in fact negative
emotions are experienced more by leftist participants, of the side
opposite to the parodied politician.
So, it is interesting to highlight how a parody, when deep, can
be a moral priming, due to its eliciting moral emotions such as
outrage, and exacerbates evaluative processes (Ben-Nun Bloom,
2014; Ruch and Heintz, 2016) toward politicians and also politics,
increasing the tendency to distrust.
One more issue we explored are the thoughts associated to the
affective state induced by the two types of parody: when asked
about their reflections after the video, participants in the surface
condition mainly expressed negative and critical thoughts, hence
distrust toward the politician and the socio-economic condition,
while in the deep condition, negative thoughts concerning the
socio-economic situation, but mainly toward politics in general
increase.
Surface parody, keeping its representation within the source
category, looks more informative and closer to the real politician,
hence inducing critical and distrusting reflections on the
Character, Minister Tremonti represented while computing on
his calculator. Instead, Tremonti represented in the category of
an absolutist King despising the people out of his door increases
indignation and contempt, hence distrust in the whole political
class. Thus evoking a higher level of cynicism.
A particular mention is to be done concerning political
orientation, from which no significant results emerge to confirm
a strong difference between rightist and leftist groups (Bonferroni
test). This seems due to the peculiarities of the parodied character,
who belongs to the right, but is not presently part of the leading
group of the party; moreover, Tremonti was considered as a
cold “technician,” being an University professor of economy
before becoming a right minister, not so beloved by right voters.
In right-wing participants, the deep parody has the effect of
increasing the negative evaluation of the politician, seen as astute,
whereas the leftists maintain a generally negative assessment of
the conditions. Future work may choose a parody of a politician
strongly supported from his own party, which makes us expect a
greater polarization.
In the second study we also tested if the politician’s gender
morally affects participants’ emotions and evaluations across
parody conditions; results demonstrate that parody determines
the perception of the male politician more than does the parody
of the female, and that negative emotions and evaluations are
higher in male condition, showing that politics, as today, is
definitely more of a masculine domain (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988;
Burr, 2002): therefore the aggressive act of parody affects
the moral image of male politicians. On the contrary in the
deep parody toward the female politician participants feel less
indignation and evaluate her as less astute.
CONCLUSION
Parody is a communicative act aimed at social criticism,
performed by taking a person as Target, by finding out a trait
or behavior denoting a relevant dèfaillance with respect to
moral, esthetical, utilitarian criteria, and by making fun of it,
thus pointing out and re-inforcing socially shared evaluation
criteria. Different from serious criticism, by using the weapon
of humor the parody induces positive emotions, amusement and
laughter, and like any humorous performance triggers subtle
cognitive processes necessary to catch the frame shift and the
cognitive incongruity that evokes laughter. Yet, as our work
demonstrates, while viewing a surface parody one is induced
to a light level of frame shift, being exposed to a deep parody
requires a more radical change of perspective that forces the
Addressee to climb to a higher level of generality; this ends up
with attributing the negative evaluation borne by the parody
not only to its specific Target – for example, to that specific
politician – but to a superordinated category that includes
him/her but goes beyond. This might account for the more
pervasive effect of negative emotions and evaluations we found
in our data.
The deep parody, then, beside requiring more sophisticated
processing in both production and comprehension, also has a
deeper impact on the persuasive side, and thus the laughter it
elicits has a bitter flavor.
A first limitation of our work is that it does not explicitly state
the relation of types of parody and consequent emotions with
behavioral intentions, for example potential voting intentions,
and political participation. The investigation by Lee and Kwak
(2014), who evidenced a relationship among political satire,
experienced negative emotions, and intentions for political
participation, will be replicated in future studies concerning the
types of parody. A further limitation is the time frame of our
experiment: we found out the changes in Character and Real
Politician evaluation after seeing a video, but what is the duration
of such effects? Can such a short-term manipulation produce
long-term effects? Longitudinal studies are needed.
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One more limitation is that our manipulation regarded an
evaluation criterion – and corresponding discredit – focused on
the dimension of benevolence: the Character’s reliability. But
what differences might emerge should we consider discredit
on esthetical, cognitive, or power criteria (D’Errico and Poggi,
2012)?
A final problem is that the political orientation of our
participants was more frequently opposite to one of the parodied
politician. However, the politician used as stimulus belonged to a
somewhat distant period, thus no longer being representative of
his electors, nor so highly beloved by them.
On the basis of the present studies, future research
would need to draw a theoretical modeling of the effects of
parody by considering different possible individual variables
of the politician (right vs. left party, with respect to the
gender and sexual orientation, present vs. past politician;
representative or not), or of the target of parody criticism
(dominance, competence, benevolence) and other contextual
variables (historical period, and so on).
As proposed in previous works (Poggi et al., 2011; D’Errico
and Poggi, 2013), a possible goal in studying the mechanisms
of parody could be the construction of an “Artificial Parodist,”
that is, an Embodied Agent, a little Robot, or a wearable system,
that, through simulating the capabilities of a Human Parodist,
might fulfill various functions: a Comedians’ Trainer, able to
understand others’ goofy behaviors, discover their involuntary
humor, and advice or teach how to make a parody of them;
or a Parodist Teacher, able to make parodies of the pupils’
performance, for instance in choir singing (Poggi, forthcoming)
or foreign language learning, to explain where they are wrong; or
finally a wearable Parodist Companion, capable, when perceiving
the User’s goofy behaviors, of making a parody of him, to teach
him not to take himself too seriously, recommend him more
adaptive behavior, and thus prevent him from being ridiculed by
others.
While those works were mainly focused on the processes
of parody production by a Parodist, the goal of the present
paper was to shed light on the reception of this form of
communication: more specifically, on the mechanisms through
which a particular arrangement of information in a parody can
elicit specific affective, evaluative, and persuasive processes in
Addressees. On this side, a possible application of this study
might rather be in the domain of persuasive technology (Fogg,
2002).
Research on socially aware systems requires fine-grained
knowledge of the mechanisms of persuasion and social influence:
in this perspective, investigation on parody, its processes
of production and comprehension, and their effects on the
Audience’s emotions and evaluations, can shed light on important
aspects of social interaction and social cognition. For example,
a tutoring system with civic purposes and thus with the goal of
promoting deep political information in their audience/readers,
can, by means of parody, amuse and at the same time affect
their critical thoughts and political awareness in different ways
depending on the types of representation and on the types of
parody performed.
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